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INSIGHTS FOR LEGAL REASONING FROM 
STUDIES OF LITERARY ADAPTATION AND 
INTERTEXTUALITY 
GEORGE RAITT∗ 
Legal theorists advance conflicting theories to explain judicial reasoning, 
for example, that judges’ decisions are constrained but not determined by 
legal materials, that judges do not apply legal principles but make value 
judgments, and that they make pragmatic judgments based on an 
assessment of the consequences of their decisions. Like cases should be 
decided alike, but theorists disagree on the role of analogy in legal 
reasoning and how one determines which similarities and differences are 
relevant. Judicial decisions revise and adapt previously decided cases. The 
concept of fidelity to precedent in legal reasoning can be illuminated by 
recent research into fidelity to source in adaptation studies. Research into 
literary adaptations shows that similarity and difference are not mutually 
exclusive and that an analysis of differences may undermine determinations 
of relevant similarity. By reading decided cases as intertextually situated 
adaptations, underlying views of the world that might not otherwise be 
evident in judicial reasoning can be interrogated.  
I INTRODUCTION 
A review of recent legal writing shows that our understanding of legal 
reasoning, and in particular the role of similarity and difference in legal 
reasoning, is incomplete if not contested.1 Whatever else may be said about 
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legal reasoning, it appears to be accepted that it is not demonstrative; that is, it 
cannot prove itself.2 In other words, legal reasoning may result in outcomes 
on which opinions differ, and it is for this reason that we have created courts 
to finally settle matters. 
The role of analogical reasoning and its relationship with reasoning from 
precedent is disputed. Edward Levi describes a three-step process of 
reasoning from precedent: first, identify a similarity between precedent and 
the present case; second, determine a rule from the precedent by a process of 
induction; and third, apply the rule to determine the present case by a process 
of deduction.3 There does not appear to be any agreement about what part, if 
any, of Levi’s process may be called analogical reasoning. 
Some critics of analogical reasoning suggest that there is an analogy in the 
first step but that it has no further work to do after the initial observation, 
whereas those who defend analogical reasoning argue that the analogy retains 
its force if the observed similarity is relevant to the further similarity that is in 
question.4 Schauer argues that reasoning from precedent requires an initial 
determination of relevant similarity, but that this is not analogical reasoning.5 
Hunter argues that analogical reasoning is fact-based, and does not involve the 
second step — that is, it does not require the generalisation of a rule.6 Schauer 
believes that analogical reasoning enables us to construct generalisations that 
illuminate comparisons.7 Brewer suggests that analogical argument 
encompasses any argument that relies on relevant similarity to support a 
conclusion from a set of premises.8 
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A reviewer of Schauer’s book, Thinking Like a Lawyer, queries where this 
debate leaves lawyers in legal practice.9 As a practising lawyer, the writer of 
this article suggests that legal practice has gone on largely untroubled by the 
theoretical controversy, and believes that experience in the field of 
commercial (or non-litigious) legal practice can usefully inform the debate. 
This article also suggests that recent research into adaptations of literature to 
the screen, in particular the role of fidelity, similarity and difference in 
reading intertextually situated adaptations, can inform our understanding of 
legal reasoning and illuminate current controversies.  
II FIDELITY TO SOURCE IN LAW AND LITERATURE 
What can a study of adaptations of literature to film tell us about legal 
reasoning? This article will use Levi’s three-step process to show how the 
process of reading intertextually situated adaptations can contribute to the 
understanding of legal reasoning.  
The role of adaptation in the law should be obvious, since judges adapt and 
revise transmitted law; this has long been recognised, for example by 
Gadamer, MacCormick and Posner.10 Similarly, it seems beyond doubt that 
the law is inherently intertextual (that is, a particular text such as a judicial 
decision cannot be interpreted without regard to its relationship to other 
texts).11 Yet the implications of these observations do not appear to have been 
fully explored in the debate about legal reasoning. 
‘Fidelity’ is a much debated subject in adaptation studies. However, there are 
few references to ‘fidelity’ in the discourse on legal reasoning. The word is 
used, for example, by Ray Finkelstein to highlight the tension in the common 
law system between ‘fidelity to precedent’ and the creative role of the judge 
in interpreting and applying law appropriately to the circumstances of the 
case.12 In the field of literary adaptations, ‘fidelity to source’ is generally 
regarded as unhelpful and inadequate to explain an adaptation. For many 
years the favoured approach was to consider an adaptation as a translation, or 
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194 DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 18 NO 1 
transposition, of the literary source into another medium, which requires a 
search for ‘cinematic equivalents’, and to distinguish this from a ‘revision’.13 
This approach treats adaptation as a vector resulting from the forces of (A) 
transposition and (B) revision respectively, as shown in Figure 1 below.  
 
The author’s research suggests that transposition and revision cannot be 
separated because it is impossible to determine ‘equivalence’, but 
‘differences’ in adaptation can nevertheless be observed and, accordingly, 
‘difference’ is a more reliable comparator.14 In law, fidelity to source is 
generally regarded as a desirable constraint.15 This entails a search for 
‘relevant similarity’,16 a concept that needs further examination. 
The prevalent concern in adaptation studies with fidelity to source, and 
cinematic equivalence, has tended to mask the effect of difference. It can be 
shown that similarity and difference are not mutually exclusive and that 
reading an adaptation informed by differences between source texts, and other 
texts in an intertextual cluster, can undermine received interpretations and 
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views of the world implicit in each.17 These ideas can be applied to the 
interpretation of legal texts such as precedents, and to legal reasoning, where 
similarity and difference also tend to be regarded as mutually exclusive.18  
MacCormick argues that legal precedents could not be taken to be absolutely 
binding unless there were a strict requirement that the same circumstances 
apply (which is impossible).19 Because there will always be differences in the 
facts of cases, Schauer suggests that the doctrine of precedent cannot be 
founded on the objective to treat like cases alike.20 Curiously, these 
considerations led Schauer to propose a strict precedential system and 
MacCormick to propose on the other hand that precedents should be regarded 
as persuasive rather than absolutely binding.21 Schauer suggests that a judge 
does not even have to think about the merits of a precedent because it binds 
regardless of its merits, and he derives from this the proposition that the judge 
faced with such a precedent does not have to make an initial determination of 
relevant similarity.22 
Judges may legitimately decline to follow a precedent if the precedent 
decision can be distinguished. However, it appears to be accepted that the 
liberty to distinguish precedents is undesirable because it can be misused and 
so creates uncertainty. A common objection is that differences between sets of 
facts are too many and too difficult to identify, for distinctions to be usefully 
made.23 Alexander argues that the liberty to distinguish precedents gives 
judges undesirable power to amend the precedent rule.24 Posner argues that 
‘distinguishing a precedent is a useful pragmatic tool when it is not merely a 
euphemism for overruling’.25 Posner suggests that the focus on ‘relevant 
similarity’ obscures differences that would animate consideration of policy 
issues.26 It seems that theories of legal reasoning are preoccupied with fidelity 
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to precedent and this discourages theorists from considering the role and 
implications of difference in legal reasoning. 
While there does not seem to be any agreement on the answer, there is broad 
agreement that the key question about similarity and difference in legal 
reasoning is: What guides the selection of some among many points of 
similarity, despite many differences?27 Sunstein concedes that the concept of 
‘relevant similarity’ appears to be problematic and indeterminate.28 Other 
writers such as Hunter, Farrar, Finkelstein, MacCormick, and Calleros 
acknowledge that reason alone cannot guide selection, or the weighing up of 
opposing factors, and that this requires a value judgment.29 Morawetz states 
that ‘interpretative choices’ in the law can ‘expose the potential embrace of 
moral strictures’.30 Alexander and Sherwin argue that judges in reality make 
moral decisions that are not constrained by legal principles or analogical 
reasoning (though judges purport to apply legal principles and reasoning).31 
The interpretative strategies suggested in this article offer a way of 
interrogating these underlying factors. Experience suggests that competing 
policies and values are not always evident in judgments, which typically 
explain the outcome having regard to precedent.32 It is suggested here that the 
outcomes reflect the judges’ view of the world, and that comparative reading 
informed by differences can illuminate this more effectively than, for 
example, research into the political flavour of the government that appointed 
the judges.33  
The terms ‘world view’ and ‘view of the world’ are used in this article to refer 
to any view about how the world is or should be. This concept embraces 
variously described underlying factors such as ‘value judgments’ and ‘policy 
considerations’. The key word is ‘view’, indicating that we are dealing with 
constructs. It is suggested that any view about how the world ‘is’ carries with 
it a view about how the world ‘should be’. It is suggested here that adaptation 
alters the relationship between views about how the world is and should be. In 
the context of adaptation studies, it is shown that reading an intertextually 
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situated adaptation informed by differences between source and other texts 
can illuminate and undermine received interpretations of a text and embedded 
views of the world.34 This article argues that this method of reading should be 
capable of application in the legal context with corresponding results. To 
develop that argument it is desirable to discuss some aspects of adaptation and 
intertextuality in more detail.  
III ADAPTATION AND INTERTEXTUALITY 
Comparative reading of a screen adaptation and literary source has been 
criticised on the grounds that reading the two in isolation often privileges the 
literary source, and is considered inadequate to explain and interpret the 
adaptation.35 It is often suggested that an adaptation must be interpreted 
having regard to other works in the intertextual field.36 It is said that 
‘adaptation studies seek to understand not individual texts, but rather the 
relationship between texts’,37 and adaptation invites intertextual reading 
practices. 
At the same time, approaches to film adaptation which emphasise difference 
have tended to be regarded as the opposite of approaches which emphasise 
similarity (that is, which treat an adaptation as a translation, or transposition, 
                                                 
34 See George Raitt, ‘Hidden Differences’, above n 14; George Raitt, ‘Lost in Austen: Screen 
adaptation in a post-feminist world’ (2012) 40 Literature/Film Quarterly 127. 
35 Linda Hutcheon, A Theory of Adaptation (Routledge, 2006) xiii; Sarah Cardwell, ‘Adaptation 
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Christ (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007) 120–3. 
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and Infamous’ (2008) 36 Journal of Popular Film & Television 52, 57. Culler points out that 
the original use of the term ‘intertextuality’ referred not to relations between individual texts 
but to the participation of a text in the ‘discursive space of a culture’: Jonathan Culler, The 
Pursuit of Signs (Routledge, 2001) 114. In Roland Barthes’ terminology, such a text is a 
‘methodological field’ rather than a book: Roland Barthes, Image Music Text (Hill and Wang, 
1977) 157. See further Graham Allen, Intertextuality (Routledge, 2000). This article will 
depart from Barthes’ terminology and use the term ‘text’ to refer to any particular literary or 
film work (or judicial opinion). 
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of a literary text into screen media).38 This view persists in recent discourse in 
the field which advocates rejecting the transposition approach,39 advocating 
instead an approach based on difference rather than similarity.40 
Similarity and difference are not mutually exclusive and one may rehabilitate 
the study of difference without resorting to ideas of fidelity. Further, 
difference may be observed even where there is sameness or equivalence.41 
The reason for this is simply that the criteria of comparison are many and 
varied so that sameness on some criteria is consistent with difference on 
others. This can be demonstrated by comparing, for example, the lemons in a 
basket of lemons, all of which are superficially ‘the same’ (or in legal terms, 
‘fungible’). 
The lemons of course are all the same if you want to pulp them, but 
concurrently they are different sizes, shapes, weights, colours, textures; they 
have different surface blemishes and so forth — differences which might 
become relevant if you want to create a visual display or grade them for retail 
sale. We choose criteria of comparison according to our purposes.  
Lamarque uses the term ‘identity conditions’ in the context of comparing a 
poem with a hypothetical prose paraphrase (that is, an adaptation across 
literary forms).42 He concludes that sameness depends upon your chosen 
criteria of comparison (which he calls ‘the interests of the questioner’), so 
there is no absolute answer to the question whether two or more things are the 
same.43 The terms ‘sameness’ and ‘equivalence’ are used in the discourse on 
adaptation and also in the discourse on legal reasoning (along with the 
corresponding terms ‘similarity’ and ‘relevant similarity’).44 
There are significant implications from the conclusion that there is no 
absolute answer to the question whether ‘similarity’ or ‘relevant similarity’ is 
determinable. The first is that adaptation is a vector of forces which cannot be 
separated into translation, or transposition, on the one hand and revision on 
                                                 
38 James Naremore, ‘Introduction’ in James Naremore (ed), Film Adaptation (Rutgers, 2000) 1, 
7–8. 
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40 Christa Albrecht-Crane and Dennis Cutchins, ‘Introduction: New Beginnings for Adaptation 
Studies’ in Christa Albrecht-Crane and Dennis Cutchins (eds), Adaptation Studies: New 
Approaches (Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2010) 11, 16. 
41 See Raitt, ‘Still Lusting after Fidelity?’, above n 13. 
42 Peter Lamarque, ‘The Elusiveness of Poetic Meaning’ (2009) XXII Ratio (new series) 398, 
409–10. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, above n 1, 91. 
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the other. The second is that it is possible, nevertheless, to identify 
differences. 
The approach followed in this article provides the conceptual underpinning to 
rehabilitate difference without framing it as the opposite of similarity or 
framing an approach based on difference as the opposite of a ‘fidelity’ 
approach. Gilles Deleuze, in his seminal study of the philosophy of difference, 
suggests that, by means of this opposition, sameness ‘crucifies’ difference.45 
By privileging fidelity to source, or similarity, in legal reasoning, the effect is 
likewise to neglect difference. 
Leitch argues that the attempt to impose order on ‘what would otherwise be 
an endless flow of intertextuality’ by, for example, giving primacy to a source 
text over other texts in the intertextual field, in fact only creates an illusion of 
order.46 In the present author’s view there is nothing to fear, and no 
impending chaos, in having regard to interrelations of difference (in either the 
literary or legal context). An individual text is distinguished by what it is, and 
also by how it differs from other texts. Sunstein quotes Bishop Butler: 
‘Everything is what it is, and not another thing.’47 This could be adapted as: 
‘Everything is what it is, and differs from every other thing.’ 
In comparative literary studies it is taken for granted that the juxtaposition of 
two texts leads to the illumination of both.48 Bazin comes to a similar 
conclusion with respect to adaptation of literature to film when he says that 
the effect of juxtaposing a literary source and the film adaptation is to 
‘reaffirm their differences’.49 A further example of the role of difference in 
interpretation is Bakhtin’s dialogic theory of the ‘utterance’, which always 
responds to a previous utterance, and is regarded as ‘non-reiterative’,50 that is, 
it cannot be repeated without giving rise to differences. As Warren observes, 
‘[e]very true use of language is an attempt to explore a new meaning, a new 
idea, or a new perspective on an old idea or concept’.51 It can be argued that 
any text is intertextually situated; it sits in an interrelationship of difference 
                                                 
45 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition (Continuum, 2004) 174. 
46 Thomas Leitch, ‘The Texts behind The Killers’ in Barton Palmer (ed), Twentieth-Century 
American Fiction on Screen (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 41. 
47 Sunstein, above n 1, 757. 
48 Anna Balakian, ‘Theorising Comparison: The Pyramid of Similitude and Difference’ (1995) 
69 World Literature Today 263, 264. 
49 André Bazin, What is Cinema? (University of California Press, 1971) 136. 
50 Tzvetan Todorov, Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogical Principle (University of Minnesota Press, 
1984) 45; Valentin Voloshinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language (Seminar Press, 
1973) 99; see also Allen, above n 37, 27–8. 
51 Warren, above n 2, 123. 
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with other texts which may inform reading. This interplay between 
intertextually situated texts can be regarded as a dialogue mediated by 
difference. As noted above, judicial decisions are inherently intertextual, 
which suggests that legal reasoning may be illuminated by having regard to 
such a dialogic relationship. 
As noted above, some approaches to adaptation studies emphasise relations of 
connection — they focus on traces and degrees of sameness. Iampolski 
develops an intertextual approach to film adaptation that is based on relations 
of connection between the literary source and the film adaptation.52 Hunter’s 
proposed process of ‘similarity matching’ or ‘mapping’ in legal reasoning 
seems also to be based on relations of bilateral connection between source and 
target cases.53 These approaches treat the adaptation and source in apparent 
isolation from other texts whereas this article suggests that when we approach 
an intertextually situated text (whether a literary work or film adaptation or a 
judicial opinion), our interpretation of the text can be usefully informed by 
relations of difference between that and other texts in the intertextual field and 
by switching between new interpretations made possible by differences 
between those texts.54 
Hutcheon suggests that, in experiencing a work as an adaptation, one 
‘oscillates’ between the adaptation and its source.55 Hutcheon also describes 
this as ‘flipping back and forth’,56 which leads Leitch to propose more 
generally: 
Watching or reading an adaptation as an adaptation invites audience 
members to test their assumptions, not only about familiar texts but about 
the ideas of themselves, others, and the world those texts project against the 
new ideas fostered by the adaptation and the new reading strategies it 
encourages.57 
                                                 
52 Mikhail Iampolski, The Memory of Tiresias: Intertextuality and Film (University of 
California Press, 1998). 
53 Hunter, above n 1, 1211. MacCormick, above n 1, 211 remarks that Hunter’s idea about the 
closeness of analogies could be useful when competing analogies arise. However, for reasons 
explained above, the concept of ‘closeness’ is problematic. 
54 George Raitt, ‘Looking For a Sign From Home: Fay Zwicky and Gerhard Marcks’ Der 
Rufer’ (2007) 52 Westerly 131, 134. The term ‘switching’ is taken from the author’s earlier 
work in the field of ekphrasis (poetry responding to visual art), where it is shown that 
switching between new interpretations made possible by differences informs comparative 
reading of an ekphrastic poem and precursor work of visual art. 
55 Hutcheon, above n 35, xv, 121. 
56 Ibid 69. 
57 Thomas Leitch, ‘Adaptation, the Genre’ (2008) 1 Adaptation 106, 116. 
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It could be said that screen adaptation invites reading together with the source 
and other texts in the intertextual field. It is suggested that switching between 
new interpretations made possible by differences is more than an ambivalent 
flipping back and forth between opposed interpretations; rather it is a repeated 
process of switching between multiple texts in the intertextual field, and it is 
this process that reveals new interpretations that undermine, for example, 
received interpretations and implicit views of the world. 
Much of the research on literary adaptation concerns fiction. However, 
research into adaptation of non-fiction narratives supports an argument that 
the ideas proposed above can be applied to legal texts.58 It can be argued that 
selection and foregrounding, both in the case of creating a non-fiction 
narrative, and equally in adapting such a narrative to the screen, produces a 
representation that can reasonably be expected to give rise to differences from 
the source.59 Turning back to the law, we can see that legal interpretation also 
involves elements of selection and reconstruction, as MacCormick 
acknowledges.60 
The method of comparative reading proposed in this article, informed as it is 
by differences and switching, is a new approach to the problem of reading an 
adaptation as an adaptation while acknowledging its situation in the 
intertextual field. The approach can be applied equally to a single source, or to 
works in an intertextual cluster, to show in each case how differences and 
switching affect the interpretation of an adaptation informed by such texts. It 
is recognised here that the relationship between an adaptation and a single 
source text is inadequate to elucidate an adaptation. This recognition is 
apposite to legal reasoning from precedent, as some studies referred to in this 
article oversimplify the analysis to consider only the relation between a 
judgment and a single precedent, or perhaps two precedents, whereas most 
cases in legal practice raise multiple issues that require consideration of many 
precedents, some of which inevitably conflict in their potential application 
with the case at hand. Further, a judgment is rarely a single coherent opinion. 
More often there is divergence if not dissent among the judges in a single 
case, who often include one or two hierarchies of appellate judges in addition 
to the judge at first instance. 
                                                 
58 George Raitt, ‘Adaptation and Self-Undermining Postmodern Views of the World’ (Paper 
presented at the Film-Philosophy Conference, Liverpool, July 2011), organised by Film-
Philosophy and Liverpool John Moores University, abstract available at <http://www.film-
philosophy.com/conference/index.php/conf/2011/paper/view/26>. 
59 Dan Zahavi, ‘Self and Other: The Limits of Narrative Understanding’ in Daniel Hutto (ed), 
Narrative and Understanding Persons (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 182–3. See also 
Rocco Versace, This Book Contains Graphic Language: Comics as Literature (Continuum, 
2007) 36. 
60 MacCormick, above n 1, 29. 
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The present author’s research on adaptation concentrates on the way the 
source and the adaptation each constructs a world and how subtle differences 
between them undermine views of the world. In literary and visual art, it is 
accepted that the work of art is a representation or construct, a ‘view of the 
world’.61 Lamarque describes the literary story world as ‘a world of artifice 
and structure’.62 It is suggested here that legal argument and legal judgments 
also create a world of artifice and structure. This statement is not intended to 
be derogatory; it simply suggests that lawyers and judges each, as a group, 
construct a matrix of facts and a view of how the world should be (that is, 
legal rules) that, they consider, determine the outcome of the case.63 Applying 
this kind of comparative reading to legal texts provides an opportunity to 
understand the views of the world that the texts implicitly construct, and such 
a reading, informed by differences and switching, should enable us to 
interrogate those views. 
IV LEGAL REASONING REVISITED 
Let us consider the two examples of analogical reasoning from the practical 
world discussed by Weinreb.64 Mary spills cranberry juice on a table cloth and 
a friend suggests pouring salt on it because that works with red wine. Charlie 
cannot start his lawnmower and decides to let it stand for a while because that 
sometimes works when his car does not start. These examples show persons 
forming hypotheses that can be tested empirically. In each case the hypothesis 
will be tested and will either succeed or fail. However, in these examples even 
the case of success does not amount to more than an observation of an effect 
without an understanding of the cause or an ability to predict whether the 
procedure will succeed in future. For example, further empirical testing with a 
control might show that the result would have been achieved without the 
hypothesised procedure, or that the procedure only succeeds when other 
critical factors are present. These examples show us that empirical theory 
cannot prove itself; that is, abstract reasoning about the physical world alone 
is not enough to provide an understanding of the world and to predict whether 
a procedure will give the same results in future. 
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These examples do not address the possibility of searching the body of 
knowledge to find out whether there is a known answer,65 or the possibility of 
being faced with multiple conflicting analogies, which is more like the 
situation usually encountered in the law. For example, United States courts 
have had to decide whether a paddle steamer is more like a hotel on the one 
hand or a railroad on the other in determining the liability of the proprietor for 
a passenger’s belongings.66 They have likewise had to decide whether a 
mobile home is more like a residence than a motor vehicle in determining 
whether a search warrant is required for police officers to enter without the 
consent of the owner.67 In these examples the conflicting analogies are 
supported by precedents, and so the court deciding the case is faced not 
merely with conflicting analogies but conflicting precedents. In this context 
we may reconsider Schauer’s attempt to distinguish between analogical 
reasoning and reasoning from precedent: he proposes that one selects a 
suitable analogy in order to support an argument, so in reality analogy is 
merely a persuasive device. In contrast, a precedent determines the outcome 
of the argument and must be followed by the court deciding the subsequent 
case.68 This distinction does not stand up in practice where conflicting 
precedents are ubiquitous. 
This aspect of the legal context also confronts us when we come to the 
question of ‘relevant similarity’. Schauer observes that the precedential 
system is rule-based rather than fact-based,69 and accordingly ‘[i]t is the legal 
rule that tells us when two things are similar’.70 MacCormick suggests that 
‘there is a need for formulation of some principle that captures what the 
relevant similarity is’.71 This raises the question of how we choose between 
conflicting precedents or rules because after the rule has been chosen it is self-
justifying to suggest that the rule determines ‘relevant similarity’. Rules have 
purposes and it is more likely to be these purposes than the bare rule which 
determine relevance. For example, why should a hotel proprietor be liable for 
guests’ belongings, but not a railroad proprietor? 
Sperber and Wilson recognise that ‘relevance’ tends to be intuitive and they 
seek to develop a theoretical concept of relevance that will explain and predict 
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such intuitions.72 They define ‘relevance’ as a relation between a set of 
assumptions and the context in which information is processed.73 This article 
suggests that the concept of ‘world view’ captures the set of assumptions and 
interests of the judge deciding the case and that comparative reading informed 
by differences and switching should enable us to interrogate world views that 
are implicit in judicial determinations. 
Returning to Weinreb’s examples of reasoning in the practical world, it can be 
seen that they do not raise any of the normative issues or potential value 
judgments which are typically encountered in the law. Weinreb suggests that 
reasoning in the judicial context differs from reasoning in the practical world 
in only one significant respect: judicial reasoning cannot be tested because it 
determines the outcome.74 That is, a judicial determination is not a proof, and 
cannot be proved.75 It is suggested here, however, that judicial reasoning can 
be tested before the event and that this is desirable because the court is not 
simply disposing of the case before it — the court is adding to the common 
law rules that will determine future cases.76 We know that judges can and do 
consider the consequences of their decisions before they make them.77 It is not 
suggested that judges are guided solely by pragmatism to the exclusion of all 
else, but that this is one means by which a proposed ruling can be tested, 
albeit by ‘thought experiment’ rather than empirical test. Sunstein 
acknowledges that ‘analogical reasoning can go wrong when one case is said 
to be analogous to another on the basis of a unifying principle without having 
been tested against other possibilities’.78 Weinreb discusses Brewer’s 
suggestion that legal reasoning involves testing proposed rules; in Weinreb’s 
words, this happens by ‘working back and forth’.79 It is suggested here that 
switching between alternative interpretations arising from differences between 
the case at hand, precedents and other possibilities is part of the testing 
process in legal reasoning.80 
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It is useful to briefly consider the way in which commercial (that is non-
litigious) legal practice can inform the understanding of legal reasoning. 
Traditionally, it has been assumed that to think like a lawyer requires an 
ability to predict what a judge would do. For example, MacCormick argues 
that ‘[k]nowing the law is knowing how to predict what the authoritative 
decision makers will decide’.81 However, knowing the law is not an end in 
itself; the task of the commercial lawyer is to advise the client what he or she 
can do within the law, which requires the lawyer to test a wider range of 
possibilities than a judge. As Flood observes, the role of commercial lawyers 
is to manage uncertainty for themselves and their clients.82 However, Flood 
goes on to suggest that commercial lawyers do not practise law as such 
because in a fluid situation such as a business negotiation, the lawyer must 
rely on ‘experiential skills’ rather than legal knowledge. It is submitted that 
this is incorrect, and that the way commercial lawyers and judges identify and 
test possibilities is different only in degree rather than in kind. 
VII CONCLUSION 
This article set out to examine the role of similarity and difference in legal 
reasoning informed by insights from studies of adaptation and intertextuality. 
By privileging fidelity to precedent the discourse on legal reasoning has (like 
the discourse on literary adaptation) tended to neglect or obscure difference. 
The indeterminacy which has been attributed to analogical reasoning is in fact 
properly attributed to ‘similarity’ and ‘relevant similarity’. We should 
rehabilitate comparative reading in the intertextual field (that is, we should 
promote the act of ‘distinguishing’ differences) as a useful method in legal 
reasoning. 
Judges test possibilities in a pragmatic way to a greater extent than might 
otherwise be thought. Comparative reading informed by differences, and the 
switching between interpretations that is made possible by differences, has a 
role in the process of testing possible decisions before they are made. These 
insights may assist to increase the appreciation of commercial legal practice 
and the contribution it can make to our understanding of legal reasoning. 
Levi’s three-step process has been followed in this article: first, it has been 
observed that literary adaptations and judicial decisions are both intertextually 
situated adaptations; second, some universal propositions concerning the role 
of fidelity, similarity and difference in the relationship between adaptation, 
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source and other intertexts have been derived by a process of induction; and 
third, such propositions have been applied, by a process of deduction, to legal 
reasoning. The proposed method of comparative reading should enable us to 
interrogate underlying views of the world that might not otherwise be evident 
in judicial reasoning. 
This process of reasoning has force because the analysis of similarity and 
difference can be seen as having universal validity. However, further 
empirical research is required to demonstrate that the method of reading 
provides insights into judicial reasoning by illuminating underlying world 
views. This article will, it is hoped, suggest to the reader many possibilities 
for further comparative research. For example, contemporary appellate 
decisions could be compared with the respective lower court decisions to 
reveal how judges select and foreground facts and how they adapt and revise 
transmitted law. 
 
